This paper analyzes the effects of a multilateral debt relief program on child health. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank launched the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative in the late 1990s to reduce the debt burdens of poor countries, and explicitly linked the initiative to the aim of poverty reduction and social targets. As a result, debt-servicing costs have gone down by an average 1.8 percentage points of gross domestic product in Heavily Indebted Poor Countries. However, the social effects of debt relief are not well known. The paper employs micro data on infant mortality from 56 country-specific Demographic and Health Surveys to investigate the effects of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative on child health. The retrospective fertility structure of the data allows for analysis using the within-mother variation in the probability of survival of babies before and after different stages of the initiative. The results suggest that after a debt-ridden country enters the program, which is conditional on reform and pro-development policies, and receives interim debt relief, the probability of infant mortality goes down by about 0.5 percentage point. This translates into about 3,000 fewer infant deaths in an average Heavily Indebted Poor Country. The findings are particularly strong for infants born to poor mothers and mothers living in rural areas, and are driven by access to vaccines early in life and during pregnancy. There are no child health effects from graduating from the program and receiving full debt relief.
Introduction
In 1996 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank launched the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative to reduce the debt burdens of poor countries and to ensure that no poor country faces an unmanageable external debt burden. After a review of the initiative in 1999, an enhanced version was launched to broaden, deepen, and accelerate the debt relief efforts and directly link them to poverty reduction and social policies in recipient countries. The aim was to lower the debt-servicing costs in order to increase fiscal space and free up resources for pro-development policies.
Additional multilateral debt relief with the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) was introduced in 2005 to speed up the progress toward meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 1 by 2015.
Debt relief as an instrument of development assistance is not new, but the enhanced HIPC Initiative (and the MDRI) include multilateral debt and measures for poverty reduction in all participating countries, which has previously not been the case (e.g., the Baker and Brady Plans introduced in the 1980s to bail out private creditors 2 ). The enhanced HIPC Initiative includes country-specific poverty reduction strategies formulated in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in which each country, in partnership with the IMF and the World Bank, presents strategies on how to utilize the freed-up resources from debt relief to reduce poverty and promote development. Health and education are crucial focus areas in these country-specific PRSPs.
In this paper, I analyze if debt relief under the HIPC Initiative has had an impact on child health measured by infant mortality. The effects on child health are of great interest since there was a strong emphasis on health in the country-specific development policies put forward along with the HIPC Initiative. Furthermore, improvements in health are not only ends in themselves, but also strongly linked to other measures on welfare both at the individual and national levels. Child health is of great relevance since poor health in childhood causes great damage to health and welfare later in life (Alderman, Hoddinott, & Kinsey, 2006; Maluccio et al., 2009 ). In addition, data availability on infant mortality enables reliable empirical analysis of the social targets of debt relief.
The HIPC Initiative comprises of two stages: Decision Point and Completion Point. A debt-ridden and poor country must show a track record of reform in accordance with agreements with the IMF and the World Bank, which includes plans for human development targets, to reach Decision Point where the path to debt sustainability is decided and the country benefits from interim debt relief. At Decision 1 The MDGs were introduced in 2000 and are (i) Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, (ii) Achieve universal primary education, (iii) Promote gender equality and empower women, (iv) Reduce child mortality, (v) Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and other diseases, (vii) Ensure environmental stability, and (viii) Develop a global partnership for development (The UN, 2015) .
2 See Cassimon, Essers, and Verbeke (2015) for more on the history of debt relief.
Point, the country sets out to implement reforms and achieve social targets which are necessary to reach
Completion Point where full debt relief in line with the settlements made at Decision Point is granted.
In December 2014, the IMF reported that the enhanced HIPC Initiative and the MDRI had led to a 2.5
percentage point increase in poverty-reducing spending between 2001 and 2013 in recipient countries.
This represents a total cost to creditors of US$116.1 billion (present values for both the enhanced HIPC Initiative and the MDRI at the end of 2013) (IMF, 2014) , which equals approximately 20 percent of the total GDP in all HIPCs in 2013 (World Bank, 2015) .
Debt relief may affect child health through various channels. There may be increases in health expenditures and improved efforts to strengthen health-service delivery as debt-servicing costs go down (e.g. Chauvin & Kraay, 2005; Cassimon, Van Campenhout, Ferry, & Raffinot, 2015) . These effects may be strongest for the poor and vulnerable, for whom public expenditures and health-service delivery are less likely to merely substitute for private expenditures and delivery. If debt relief has an impact on other aid flows to debt-ridden and poor countries, we may see health effects in line with what is recorded in the literature on foreign aid and health (e.g. Powell, 2003; Gyimah-Brempong, 2015) . Also, the debt overhang hypothesis, which stipulates that high debt may be seen as a high tax on investment and reform, (Krugman, 1988; Sachs, 1989) suggests that countries suffering from high debt may see increased investment and economic growth from debt relief, which, in turn, may have a positive impact on child health (e.g. Clement, Bhattacharya, & Nguyen, 2005; Johansson, 2010) . Additionally, improvements in child health from HIPC debt relief through these channels may be linked to the emphasis on and strong oversight of pro-development policies in HIPCs at the different stages of the initiative.
The impacts of debt relief in general and the HIPC Initiative in particular on child health are not well known. Thomas and Giugale (2015) show that the general economic and social development in African HIPCs has been positive since the initiative was rolled out and Marcelino and Hakobyan (2014) argue that economic growth has gone up after HIPC debt relief. In a World Bank report on HIPC debt relief, Schmid (2009) finds that the infant mortality rate declines after a HIPC reaches Decision Point of the program. However, this study relies on country-level data on child health and was performed only a few years after the initiative came into effect. There may thus be problems with confounding factors which are difficult to account for in cross-country analyses. There are also drawbacks with the analysis in Schmid (2009) related to the relatively short time frame. In the same report Crespo Cuaresma and Vincelette (2009) find increases in educational attainment and expenditures after HIPC Decision and Completion Points. Again, however, there are concerns with regard to endogeneity and the short time frame of the analysis, and we currently lack reliable knowledge and evidence of the social effects of debt relief.
I investigate whether the enhanced HIPC Initiative has an impact on child health by applying micro data on infant mortality from country-specific Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) from 56 lowand middle-income countries of which 31 are HIPCs. The retrospective fertility nature of the data from the DHS allows for panel data analysis using the within-mother variation in the probability of survival of babies born before and after the countries reach the Decision and Completion Points of the debt relief program. Within-mother estimation accounts for unobservable characteristics of the family and controls for effects that arise due to changes in the demographic composition. This reduces problems with crosscountry confounding factors -say, if households in HIPCs, on average, are different from households in non-HIPCs -and facilitates a causal interpretation of the results. In addition, this approach allows for distributional analysis of the debt relief effects on child health and the detailed DHS data give indications of potential health mechanisms through which HIPC affects infant mortality.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper which uses cross-country micro data to analyze the potential impacts of debt relief on child health. It aims to contribute to the vast empirical literature on the effects of development assistance in general and debt relief in particular on child health. My findings suggest that when a country qualifies for Decision Point, the probability of infant mortality goes down by approximately 0.5 percentage points or five infant deaths per 1,000 live births. This represents 7 percent of the sample mean and translates into approximately 3,000 fewer infant deaths in an average HIPC in the year of Decision Point. Results are stronger for infants born to mothers who are poor and mothers living in rural areas. Neonatal mortality is largely unaffected by debt relief, which indicates that the impacts of Decision Point on infant mortality go through interventions or policies which affect infant survival after the first month of life. Moreover, analysis of potential health mechanisms suggest that the improvements in infant mortality are driven by improved access to vaccines early in life and during mothers' pregnancies. Immunization rates against Tuberculosis and Polio among children born to poor, uneducated, and rural mothers go up 4 to 6 percent of the sample coverage rates in these groups and
Tetanus immunization rates among poor, uneducated, and rural pregnant mothers increase with about 9 percent of the sample means. The improvement in infant mortality takes place at Decision Point with no additional effect at Completion Point where full debt relief is granted. Results are robust to various country-specific confounders and other sensitivity tests.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a brief background of the HIPC
Initiative. I present the data on child health and the empirical specification in Section 3 and the results and various sensitivity analyses in Section 4. Section 4 also includes health mechanisms analysis through which the HIPC Initiative may affect child health. Concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
The HIPC Initiative
The original HIPC Initiative was launched in 1996 by the IMF and the World Bank. The aim was to reduce the debt burdens of poor countries and to ensure sustainable debt accumulation in all HIPC countries. Only six countries 3 were included in the original program but after a review in 1999, the initiative was enhanced to include more countries and create stronger ties to poverty reduction and prodevelopment reforms. In this paper, I focus on the enhanced version of the HIPC Initiative, and it is hereafter referred to as the HIPC Initiative to avoid confusion with definitions.
Countries that qualify for concessional assistance from the World Bank's International Development Table 2 presents a complete list of the 56 countries in the sample and information on the DHS used in the empirical analysis. 5 The main child health outcomes in this paper, infant mortality and neonatal mortality, are defined as a baby dying before reaching his or her first birthday or month of life, respectively. Children born less than twelve months prior to their mother's interview are dropped since it is not possible to know whether they will survive their first birthday. Also, only children born after their country's year of independence are included in the sample. This gives a sample of 1,770,705 children born to 501,800 mothers between 1967 and 2013 in the 56 countries. The sample average infant mortality rate is 7 percent and the neonatal mortality rate is 3.5 percent, indicating that half of the children that die before turning one year in fact live less than one month. Figure 3 presents the yearly infant and neonatal mortality rates of the group of HIPCs and non-HIPCs. The differences between the groups are greater for infant mortality than for neonatal mortality and the general trend is decreasing for both mortality measures. Since there appears to be some differences in the trends between the two groups, I control for country-specific linear time trends in the model specification presented below. Table 4 .
Since age is significant (first column in Table 4 ), the regressions on poverty, educational status, and rural residency in columns (2) to (4) apply country-age fixed effects to compare women of different countries at the same age. Compared with mothers who only give birth before or only after the different stages of debt relief, the mothers giving birth on both sides of debt relief are older, less educated (no formal schooling), more likely to reside in rural areas, and poorer. Thus, results on debt relief presented in Section 4 may be indicative of which effects the HIPC Initiative has on more vulnerable women who fulfill these criteria. The sensitivity analyses in Section 4.2 give further discussions and tests on how debt relief may affect the sample of women.
The Empirical Model
I apply a linear probability model to investigate the relationship between debt relief and infant mortality.
Since the error terms are likely to be autocorrelated, the fixed effects logit model is not an appropriate alternative and the coefficient estimates of the linear model have a more straightforward interpretation (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005) . The model is presented below,
In f ant Mortality imacy = α m + β ay + γDebt Relie f cy + δ c Trend cy
where the dependent variable In f ant Mortality imacy is a dummy which equals one if baby i, born in country c to mother m, born in mother's birth cohort (five-year) a, in year y, dies before reaching one year of age. In some specifications, this variable is replaced by Neonatal Mortality imacy , which equals one in case of death before the baby reaches one month of age. Debt Relie f cy is a dummy variable equal The mother fixed effect is given by α m and β ay is a mother's-birth-cohort by child's-birth-year dummy which together gives the differences in mortality within mothers over time and subsequently differences between mothers within birth cohorts across countries. This controls for the fact that the effect of a mother's age on infant mortality is likely to change over time due to cross-country improvements in the survival of babies. In some estimations, β ay is substituted for a simple birth-year fixed effect, β y . In order to compare the within-mother results with the results from a within-country model, the mother fixed effect, α m , is replaced by a country fixed effect, α c . I also take compositional changes among the mothers in different countries into account by including dummy variables for the following mother-specific socioeconomic characteristics: poverty, educational status, and residency in some within-country regressions.
The vector of exogenous controls, x imacy , includes a girl dummy, multiple-birth dummy, birth-order dummies (one for each birth order starting from two and upward, birth order one is the reference, with one dummy for birth order ten and higher), and dummies for which quarter of the year the birth takes place (quarter one is the reference). Country-specific linear time trends are included to account for trend differences in cross-country mortality.
To enable distributional analyses of reaching the different stages of HIPC, I interact Debt Relie f cy with the following child-and mother-specific characteristics: girl infant and the socioeconomic status of mothers: poverty, educational status, and residency. I estimate the following specification,
In f ant Mortality imacy =α m + β ay + γ 1 Debt Relie f cy + γ 2 Debt Relie f cy ×Characteristic i + δ c Trend cy + x imacy θ + ε imacy
In all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the country level to account for within-country correlations of ε imacy . This allows the standard errors to be correlated across siblings since siblings are assumed to be in the same country. The consistency of the empirical specification relies on ε imacy being uncorrelated with the debt relief variables over time and other countries where mothers of the same cohort have children in the same year.
Results
This section presents the results of the estimations based on the main specifications in equations 1 and 2. The main findings in Section 4.1 are followed by various sensitivity analyses in Section 4.2, and an investigation into the potential health mechanisms through which debt relief under the HIPC Initiative may influence child health in Section 4.3.
Main Results
I present the results from the estimations based on the linear probability specification in Equation 1 with infant mortality as the dependent variable in Table 5 . Panel A gives the results for when a country reaches Decision Point and Panel B the results for reaching Completion Point. All estimations include exogenous controls specified in Section 3.2 (x imacy ). The first column gives the findings for the regressions using country-level fixed effects and cohort-birth-year dummies and in the second column I add the mother-specific characteristics (poverty, education, and residency). The third and forth columns both apply mother fixed effects along with mother-cohort-birth-year fixed effects and birth-year fixed effects, respectively. All estimations include country-specific linear time trends.
Most exogenous controls are significant (mainly at the five or one percent levels) and behave similarly in all regressions. Babies of multiple births are less likely to survive their first year compared with singletons, and girls are more likely to survive than boys. Firstborns tend to have a higher risk of dying in comparison with higher birth orders, and babies born in the second, third, or fourth quarters of the year are less likely to survive than babies born in the first quarter. In addition, the results on the country-specific time trends illustrate a general improvement in child health.
Looking at the effects of reaching the years of Decision Point and Completion Point of HIPC, the results suggest that there is an improvement in child health after reaching Decision Point but not Completion Point of the initiative. The within-country model in column (1) in Table 5 shows that the probability of a child dying before turning one year is reduced by 0.66 percentage points the year of Decision Point and the effect goes up to 0.73 percentage points when mother-specific characteristics (poverty, education, and residency) are accounted for. However, since columns (1) and (2) only give the within-country estimates, I turn to the within-mother estimations in columns (3) and (4) to see whether the effect stands.
The size of the coefficient decreases by about 0.1-0.2 percentage points, but there is nevertheless a 0.52 percentage points reduction in the probability of infant death at Decision Point. In other words, 5.2 fewer infant deaths per 1,000 live births occur when a HIPC reaches Decision Point. The results from employing mother-cohort by birth-year fixed effects (column (3)) are almost identical to those with the birth-year fixed effects (column (4)). The within-mother results translate into roughly 9,200 fewer deaths in the sample and represent about 7.5 percent of the sample mean. This equals approximately 3,000 fewer infant deaths in an average HIPC in the year of Decision Point.
Taking a closer look at the dynamics of the effect at Decision Point in Figure 4 , it appears to arrive in the year a country reaches Decision Point. There are no such effects of reaching Completion Point, but something seems to be occurring two to five years prior to Completion Point. For most countries, this is the interim period between Decision Point and Completion Point dates. The important impact on infant mortality appears to be taking place starting at Decision Point and moving into the interim period.
However, since Completion Point follows Decision Point by on average 4 years, these estimates may be the Decision Point effect showing up again. Also, note that pushing the year of Completion Point five years into the future greatly reduces the number of observations that contribute to the identification of the effect of debt relief.
In Table 6 , I investigate whether reaching the two stages of the HIPC Initiative has heterogeneous effects across girl and boy infants and poor, uneducated, and rural mothers. The F statistics test Debt Relie f + Debt Relie f ×Characteristic = 0 (p value in parentheses). The findings here are in line with those in Table 5 in that reaching Decision Point reduces infant mortality whereas Completion Point effects are mainly insignificant and very close to zero.
More specifically, boy and girl infants are both less likely to die in the year of Decision Point, but there is no statistically significant difference between the estimates (-0.0048 among boys and -0.0056 among girls). A similar situation can be seen when looking at the probability of infant death across mothers' educational status. There is no statistically significant difference between children born to mothers with or without formal schooling (primary school or higher). However, the results in columns (2) and (4) suggest that the estimates vary depending on mothers' poverty and residential status. Children born to poor mothers are more affected by the country reaching Decision Point than those born to more affluent mothers. The probability of infant death drops by 0.9 percentage points among poor mothers and goes down by 0.4 percentage points among non-poor mothers. This difference is large and equals 5 fewer infant deaths per 1,000 live births for vulnerable, poor mothers. The effect on infants born to urban mothers is insignificant, whereas the reduction in the risk of infant death is significant and 0.68 percentage points or 6.8 fewer infant deaths per 1,000 live births among mothers living in rural areas. 
Sensitivity Analyses
The DHS data and the information on HIPC status (which month debt relief at Decision Point and Completion Point is granted, see Table 1 ) allow for a more detailed analysis of the relationship between debt relief and infant mortality. In a sensitivity test, I thus exploit this monthly variation and the results that are presented in column (2) in Table 9 show that the month of Decision Point is associated with a 0.57 percentage point reduction in infant mortality. This is in line with the baseline findings in Section 4.
Columns (3), (4), and (5) in Table 9 show that the findings on debt relief at Decision Point are stable to including the two main debt relief variables in the same regression, a variable for the MDRI 7 , and The results in Section 4 are robust to including a dummy variable for birth intervals less than 24 months (which increases the probability of infant death (WHO, 2005) ), a variable for mother's age, and age squared (columns (6), (7), and (8), respectively). Additionally, the within-country results (including mother-specific characteristics) in column (2) in Table 5 are identical to the those in column (1) in Table   9 , which applies country fixed effects that vary by birth cohorts of the mothers.
There may be concerns with the validity of the data on infants obtained from the DHS. First, mothers may not accurately remember the birth and death (if applicable) dates of their children. If so, there may be problems with recall bias in the sample employed in this paper. This is not deemed to be a serious problem since the DHS apply rigorous tests to ensure the accuracy of the mortality data and mothers tend to remember important events such as the death of a child. Nevertheless, because there is a peak in the distribution of infant deaths at 12 months of age, I redefine the infant mortality variable as babies dying before of or in their twelfth month of age. The estimation result is presented in column (3) in Table 9 .
I observe no changes in the baseline findings because of this. Estimates are also robust to dropping the babies born before 1985 (column (4) in Table 9 ). Although the average effect and the significance level (the p value is 0.058) go down a little, the effects on the different sub-samples are stable to this change (results not shown).
I test if reported infant mortality is connected with debt relief at Decision Point of the HIPC Initiative by using DHS data on infant mortality from earlier surveys. 8 Here, I apply a test developed by Kudamatsu (2012) in which the average infant mortality rate of mothers born in the same year, in the same country, and who give birth in the same year is compared between the used DHS and an earlier DHS. If recall bias is a serious problem, the infant mortality rate would change systematically in relation to HIPC at Decision Point. Judging from the results in Table 7 , this does not appear to be the case.
Second, if fertility choices vary by women's socioeconomic status and if this is systematically related
to HIPC, one concern may be that the results on debt relief at Decision Point are driven by differences in fertility rather than infant mortality since the women who identify the effect of debt relief in the withinmother estimations are different from other mothers in terms of age, poverty levels, formal schooling, and residency. The comparison of infant mortality between women in HIPCs and non-HIPCs giving birth in the same years in the within-mother estimations would consequently be less credible. Again, I follow Kudamatsu (2012) status as a result of debt relief at Decision Point. The share of women of the same status, birth year, and country giving birth in the same year is not affected by HIPC at Decision Point and this effect does not seem to differ systematically depending on mothers' socioeconomic status, as can be seen in Table 8 .
In an additional set of sensitivity tests, I analyze if a number of country-level potential confounding factors influence the overall findings in this paper. Table 10 presents the results. In column (1), I control for logged GDP per capita (Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer, 2015) which may be an important factor determining child health, as well as a channel through which debt relief affects the same variable. The estimation suggests that income plays a statistically significant role in determining infant mortality, but it does not change the conclusions on debt relief at Decision Point. In fact, the point estimate of Decision Point goes up a little. Aid flows, net aid transfers (NAT) (% of GDP, logged) (Roodman, 2012) , and overall government expenditures (% of GDP, logged) (Feenstra et al., 2015) are potential confounders or channels, but neither affect infant mortality or influence the role of debt relief at Decision Point (columns (2) and (3) in Table 10 ). Furthermore, logged investments (% of GDP) and trade flows (% of GDP) (Feenstra et al., 2015) , along with changes in the political and democratic institutions (Polity2 (Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr, 2011) , civil liberties (Freedom House, 2014)), and political corruption (Coppedge et al., 2015) may influence the findings on debt relief. However, columns (4), (5), (6), (7), and (8) do not show any signs of this and there are no changes in the Decision Point variable. Finally, country-level changes in the fertility rate (births per woman, logged) (World Bank, 2015) may be related to changes in infant mortality, but this does not appear to be the case in this sample (column (9)).
Health Mechanisms
To analyze the potential health mechanisms through which reaching Decision Point of the HICP Initiative influences infant mortality I first test the impact of HIPC on neonatal mortality since the causes of death before one month are often different from those later in the first year of life (For The Million Death Study Collaborators, 2010). The results in Table 11 indicate that reaching Decision Point of the HIPC Initiative does not have any influence on overall neonatal mortality. There does however appear to be some heterogeneity across different sub-samples as there is a 0.33 percentage points decrease in neonatal mortality among poor mothers and 0.25 percentage points reduction among mothers without formal schooling. Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. This represents 8.3 and 5.7 percent of the sample means, respectively. In general, however, the reductions in neonatal mortality do not explain most improvements in infant health from reaching Decision Point. There does thus appear to be implications from reaching Decision Point which affect mortality after the first month of life.
To get more detailed information on how reaching Decision Point of the HIPC Initiative affects child health, I examine how a number of individual-level health measures other than mortality are associated with HIPC. The country-specific PRSPs and Decision Point documents more or less exhaustively describe which areas in the health sector are targeted for improvements in relation to HIPC and interim debt relief. The areas include health care provision for children, mothers, and disadvantaged group (rural, poor, uneducated) and sanitation measures. In some cases particular diseases are identified for prevention and treatment measures, e.g. Measles and Tuberculosis, and most countries aim for better provision of vaccines. A number of these measures are known to reduce child mortality (death before reaching five years of age) (Jones et al., 2003) and vaccines which are often given to babies before they turn one year of age, most notably Bacillus Calmette-Gurin (BCG) (against Tuberculosis), Measles, Diarrhea, and Polio, are associated with non-specific health effects and linked to reduced infant and neonatal mortality from causes other than specific diseases they are aimed at preventing (Cooper, Boyce, Wright, & Griffin, 2003 ).
In the individual-level health measure analysis I make use of older DHS data for the countries in Restricting this to a lower number than five does not influence the conclusions. Vaccination rates, skilled delivery and prenatal care, and oral rehydration solution variables not only measure the specific health care delivery channels, but may also give indications of any general progress in the health care sector which may be associated with Decision Point of the initiative.
Since mothers only report on their latest births, mother fixed effects cannot be applied in the same way as in the main analysis. 
where the dependent variable, Health Measure igacy , equals one if a baby (or mother) has received or has access to any of the above-mentioned health variables. The mother-group fixed effect is α g , and all estimations include country-specific time trends, mother's-birth-cohort (five-year) by child's-birth-year dummy, and exogenous controls for girl infant, birth-order dummies, and dummies for quarters of birth.
As can be seen in Table 13 , the probability of a baby born to a poor mother, a mother with no formal Table 14 shows that Decision Point increases the likelihood of babies with diarrhea getting oral rehydration solution treatment with 6.3 percentage points if they are born to poor mothers. This effect is large (77.9 percent of the sample mean) partly due to the very low coverage in the sample. Only four percent of the children born to poor mothers have access to flush toilets.
At Decision Point, the probability of receiving the DPT1 vaccine goes down with about 4.9 percentage points for babies born to urban mothers (5.5 percent of the sample mean), whereas the effect on babies born to rural mothers is insignificant. Similarly, the likelihood of urban mothers having access to drinking water from a piped water source drops by about 4.3 percentage points at Decision Point (ten percent of the sample mean). Babies born to urban mothers are thus the only group which experience any significant declines in the health measures examined in this exercise. However, it does not seem to translate into higher infant or neonatal mortality in this group. There do not appear to be any large differences between the health-mechanism impacts on girls and boys. Overall, the effects on the health mechanisms investigated here are in line with the reductions in infant and neonatal mortality seen in Tables 6 and 12 .
Although the health-mechanism results are not perfectly comparable to the main findings, they indicate that health care delivery through immunization programs, and to some degree also simple diarrhea treatment (among poor mothers), improve after a country reaches Decision Point of the HIPC Initiative. These measures are possibly more straightforward and uncomplicated to implement, partly with assistance from debt relief partners (mainly the World Bank and IMF), compared with advancements in child delivery and prenatal care, which are more likely to take longer and be more intricate to achieve.
Furthermore, the heterogeneous effects across different groups of mothers suggest that the aims to target vulnerable population groups set out in the PRSPs and Decision Point documents have been successful.
Conclusion
In this paper I analyze if debt relief under the HIPC Initiative is associated with better child health. I apply micro data on infant mortality from country-specific DHS from 56 low-and middle-income countries of which 31 are HIPCs to make use of mother-and family-specific effects. My findings suggest that when a country reaches Decision Point, the probability of infant mortality goes down with approximately 0.5 percentage point or 5 infant deaths per 1,000 live births. This represents approximately 3,000 fewer infant deaths in an average HIPC in the year of Decision Point. Results are stronger for infants born to poor mothers and mothers residing in rural areas. This indicates that Decision Point policies are favorable to vulnerable women and infants who are poor and/or reside in the countryside. There are no such effects when a country reaches Completion Point. Neonatal mortality is largely unaffected by debt relief under the HIPC Initiative, which indicates that the impact of HIPC at Decision Point on infant mortality does not originate from children dying within their first month of life. An important health mechanism appears to be access to vaccines, in particular against Tuberculosis, Polio, and Tetanus (given to pregnant mothers), as improvements in all these indicator come at Decision Point. Results are robust to various country-specific confounders and other sensitivity tests. All estimations include country-mothers'-birth-year-status fixed effects, mothers'-birth-year-babies'-birth-year-status fixed effects, country-specific quadratic trends in mothers' age by status. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
(8) Notes: All estimations include mother fixed effects, exogenous controls, cohort-birth-year fixed effects, and linear country-specific time trends. Column (1) includes country-specific mother's-birth-cohort fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
